Making Carbon Pricing Work by Klenert, David et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Making Carbon Pricing Work
David Klenert and Linus Mattauch and Emmanuel Combet
and Ottmar Edenhofer and Cameron Hepburn and Ryan
Rafaty and Nicholas Stern
23 August 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80943/
MPRA Paper No. 80943, posted 26 August 2017 08:23 UTC
 1 
Making Carbon Pricing Work 
David Klenert1*, Linus Mattauch2, Emmanuel Combet3, Ottmar Edenhofer4, Cameron 
Hepburn5, Ryan Rafaty6, Nicholas Stern7 
 
August 23, 2017 
 
Abstract 
Carbon-pricing initiatives are spreading at an unprecedented rate, but a considerable gap 
remains between actual prices and those required to achieve ambitious climate change 
mitigation. This perspective shows that much of this gap could be closed by enhancing 
the public’s acceptance of carbon pricing through the effective use of the substantial 
revenues raised. We synthesize findings regarding the use of carbon revenues both from 
recent behavioral and political studies as well as from economic analyses of equity and 
efficiency. We then compare real-world carbon pricing regimes with insights derived from 
theory. We find that uniform lump-sum recycling of carbon revenues to citizens is favored 
among behavioral and political studies that emphasize the importance of distributional 
fairness, revenue salience, political trust, and policy stability amid partisan changes in 
government. It is also successfully employed in several real-world recycling schemes, 
although alternative uses of revenues such as green spending may be appropriate in 
different national contexts. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economic analyses have long recommended carbon pricing as an indispensable strategy 
for efficiently reducing greenhouse gas emissions and addressing climate change. After 
setbacks over the past two decades, carbon pricing has become popular once again. 
Today there are more than 60 national or subnational initiatives, which generated US$ 26 
billion in revenue in 2015 alone (World Bank et al., 2016). Since 2016, eight new carbon-
pricing initiatives have been implemented (World Bank and Ecofys, 2017), with dozens of 
additional countries having pledged under the Paris Agreement to consider implementing 
carbon pricing in the years ahead (Figure 1).  
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The popularization of carbon pricing has been spearheaded partially by the World Bank’s 
Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition. Its High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices—of 
which one of our authors is co-chair and another is commission member— recently 
concluded that achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement requires a carbon price of $40-
$80/tCO2 by 2020, rising to $50-$100/tCO2 by 2030 (Stiglitz and Stern, 2017). With less 
than 15 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions currently covered by a carbon price, 
and less than three percent of existing prices above $40/tCO2, the time is right to expand 
coverage and identify viable means of increasing public support for a rising carbon price.    
 
Discussion of carbon pricing is also resurging in the United States, prompted by the 
Climate Leadership Council’s widely-discussed proposal for a national carbon tax with 
revenues recycled to citizens as quarterly or monthly dividends (see Nature Editorial, 
2017). California and Massachusetts are also currently considering proposals to reform 
carbon pricing with revenues primarily recycled as per capita dividends (Barrett, 2015; 
Roberts, 2017). Our findings below suggest that the appeal of these proposals stems 
largely from their incorporation of recent lessons from studies in behavioral economics 
and political science, which we collate and review for the first time. Comparing these 
studies’ recommendations to numerous real-world cases of carbon revenue allocation, 
we find that traditional lessons on efficiency and equity are subsidiary to the primary 
challenge of garnering greater political acceptability. Nevertheless they matter in the 
sense that they are also crucial determinants of the acceptability of a carbon price. 
 
 
Figure 1: The development of carbon pricing Operating, scheduled and considered carbon pricing schemes 
(Edenhofer et al., 2017). Based on World Bank (2016) and ICAP (2017). 
In particular, we identify several behavioral effects that are key determinants of the 
acceptability of carbon pricing. These behavioral effects are related to corrective taxation, 
naming of the policy, salience of its costs and benefits, green spending and cultural word 
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views. Comparing these insights against traditional equity and efficiency considerations 
we provide an ordinal classification of different recycling options by their impact on 
acceptability, equity and efficiency. We discuss how this classification and its policy 
implications match or diverge from five real-world carbon-pricing regimes. To our 
knowledge this contribution is novel. 
 
An important outcome of our assessment is that providing uniform lump-sum dividends 
to citizens is favored among behavioral and political studies that emphasize the 
importance of distributional fairness, revenue salience, political trust, and policy stability 
amid partisan changes in government. It is also successfully employed in several real-
world recycling schemes. While alternative uses of revenues such as green spending may 
be appropriate in different national contexts, our findings suggest that lump-sum 
dividends may be more stable and successful particularly in countries bogged down with 
issues of economic inequality, political mistrust, and polarization. 
 
A further challenge for carbon pricing centers on industry concerns about 
competitiveness and carbon leakage in the context of carbon-pricing policy (Aldy and 
Stavins 2012; Jenkins 2014; OECD 2015; World Bank 2015). While most companies can 
simply adapt and innovate in response to a carbon price, certain energy-intensive, trade-
exposed industries may require government assistance (Aldy and Pizer 2015). Many 
countries with a carbon price have granted energy-intensive sectors tax exemptions or 
free allocations that weaken the price signal and produce substantial windfall profits for 
a few large companies (Martin et al. 2014). This practice is suboptimal from a mitigation 
perspective, and as policymakers increasingly transition away from exemptions and free 
allocation, it will be important to broaden discussions of competitiveness. In this context, 
governments should note that competitiveness losses in fossil-based production are often 
partially or fully counterbalanced by gains in competitiveness in growing low-carbon 
sectors (Hepburn et al. 2006; Andersen and Ekins 2009). Therefore, this perspective 
instead focuses on how to make carbon pricing work for citizens by the recycling of its 
revenues. 
 
After reviewing lessons about public preferences on carbon pricing and preferable forms 
of revenue recycling from the theoretical literature (Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3), we provide 
an ordinal ranking of options based on the criteria of efficiency, equity, and public 
acceptability (described in Section 2.4), followed by a review of several real-world carbon 
pricing regimes (Section 3). We conclude with a brief discussion of the prospects for 
incorporating these lessons in ongoing and upcoming carbon-pricing proposals.  
 
2. Recent lessons from theory  
2.1 Behavioral constraints on carbon pricing 
A substantial economics literature has addressed the question of how to “optimally” 
recycle carbon-pricing revenues in the context of rational economic actors with and 
without informational constraints. In recent years, however, the field of behavioral 
economics has made clear that the assumption of households making rational choices is 
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often contradicted in practice and sometimes inadequate as a basis for policy analysis 
(Camerer et al. 2004; Chetty et al. 2009; DellaVigna 2009). Relaxing some of these 
assumptions, a nascent literature has begun to assess options for recycling carbon-pricing 
revenues.  
 
From these studies, five key effects emerge that stress the importance of revenue 
recycling for the acceptability of a carbon pricing reform: (1) citizens tend to ignore or 
doubt the corrective (“Pigouvian”) effect of carbon pricing, but are nevertheless cognizant 
of the revenue-raising aspect of such a policy. Earmarking the revenue for a specific 
purpose such as green spending or transfers to disadvantaged households appears to 
make up for this effect; (2) the labeling of the carbon price is highly important – calling 
the price a “fee” or a “climate contribution” tends to enhance acceptability as compared 
to calling it a “carbon tax”; (3) the salience of the benefits of a carbon tax reform is crucial. 
This effect suggests recycling the revenue in a highly visible fashion, such as bi-annual 
equal per capita transfers; (4) the willingness to pay a carbon price is a function of 
political, economic, and cultural beliefs, which have to be accounted for when designing 
the recycling mechanism; (5) Policy reforms tend to be more successful if the costs are 
dispersed and the benefits are concentrated.  
 
The first major effect concerns the ignorance of the Pigouvian nature of carbon pricing 
and the argument for earmarking the revenues to compensate for this effect. Conducting 
a single-price market experiment, Kallbekken et al. (2011) found that citizens often ignore 
the Pigouvian aspect of carbon prices but are well-aware of the revenue-raising aspect. 
This finding reflects public suspicions of “big government” and the ostensible revenue-
raising motives of the state.  When carbon revenues go towards the general government 
budget, some studies have found that public acceptance is lower (Baranzini et al., 2014; 
Baranzini and Carattini, 2017). If instead carbon revenues are earmarked for a specific 
purpose—e.g. as targeted green investments or transfers to particularly affected 
groups—citizens report greater acceptance of carbon pricing (Baranzini and Carattini, 
2017; Baranzini et al., 2014; Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010; Kallbekken et al., 2011). 
 
The second effect concerns the labeling of the carbon price: tax aversion is a prevalent 
feature of fiscal policy, and carbon pricing is no exception. There is some consensus that 
overcoming tax aversion is at least partly a matter of how the measure is labeled. 
Kallbekken et al. (2011) show that relabeling a carbon tax as a “fee” made it more popular, 
particularly when revenues were recycled back to citizens as uniform lump-sum 
payments—i.e. “fee and dividend”. Using survey data, Baranzini and Carattini (2017) also 
find that relabeling the tax by a different name (e.g. a “climate contribution”) increases 
public acceptance. This may be particularly true in countries with already relatively low 
levels of taxation as a percentage of GDP.  
 
The third effect concerns the salience of the carbon tax reform. Rivers and Schaeufele 
(2015), for instance, demonstrate that British Columbia’s carbon tax reform led to a much 
stronger demand reduction than could be expected from the Pigouvian nature of the tax. 
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They find that British Columbia’s carbon tax has been 4.5 times more salient than an 
equivalent change in gasoline prices. But salience appears to be important not just for the 
price itself but also for the use of revenue: Carattini et al. (2017) perform a survey study 
on the acceptability of different revenue recycling mechanisms in Switzerland – one of 
their main conclusions is that uniform lump-sum transfers are superior to other 
mechanisms in part due to their high visibility and their progressive effect. Ensuring the 
salience of the benefits includes a good communication strategy of the benefits towards 
the public (Carattini et al., 2017). These findings reflect earlier results by Chetty et al. 
(2009) regarding the salience of sales taxes. 
 
The fourth effect is that the public’s willingness to pay a given carbon price is also a 
function of political, economic, and cultural beliefs. Using discrete choice experiments, 
Alberini et al. (2016) estimate that Italians are willing to pay €133–164 per ton of CO2 
avoided, while Czechs are willing to pay €94 per ton. Ziegler (2017) found that a greater 
willingness to pay a carbon price in Germany and China is correlated with higher 
educational attainment and left-green partisan attitudes, whereas in the United States 
only partisan attitude matters, and to a considerably greater extent. Politically-motivated 
opposition to carbon pricing in the United States resembles what Campbell and Kay 
(2014) call “solution aversion”: the tendency for citizens to be more skeptical of 
environmental problems whose policy solutions contradict or challenge their underlying 
ideological predisposition, with conservatives, but not liberals, considering taxes to be 
distinct from and less preferable than subsidies. This finding is confirmed by Kahan et al. 
(2011) who identify correlations between different worldviews and skepticism towards 
climate risk. There is indeed strong evidence that this division between egalitarian-
communitarian and hierarchical-individualistic worldviews explains a great deal of public 
disagreement over carbon pricing (Cherry et al., 2017).  Hence, from an acceptability 
perspective, policymakers should avoid triggering “solution aversion” when revenue 
recycling mechanisms are designed. 
 
The fifth effect concerns the feasibility of policy reforms in general. Olson (1965) argues 
that a policy reform is more likely to be successful if the costs are diffused and the benefits 
are concentrated. Kallbekken et al. (2011) conduct a lab experiment that corroborates 
Olson’s hypothesis for the case of a carbon pricing reform. In this context, Olson’s (1965) 
point may generalized as follows: a highly salient payment to a dispersed set of recipients 
could be more politically powerful than a carbon tax on concentrated polluters. This also 
resonates with the first behavioral effect mentioned above: earmarking the revenues for 
helping a targeted group of particularly affected households might compensate for the 
lack of understanding of Pigouvian taxation. 
 
There exist a number of possible recycling mechanisms that can address one or more of 
the aforementioned behavioral effects. But one mechanism in particular, uniform lump-
sum recycling, takes advantage of most of the above effects. Recycling the revenue on an 
equal per capita basis would disproportionally benefit poorer households since they 
would receive more in transfers than they spend on taxes. There hence would be an 
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earmarking effect and Olson’s (1965) criterion would also be fulfilled as such recycling is 
progressive (see below). These transfers would be very salient since they would be direct 
transfers received by the households at regular intervals. Further, this type of recycling 
would be consistent with more center-right worldviews since it is budget-neutral and 
would not increase the size of the government. The literature that compares the 
acceptability of uniform lump-sum transfers to other recycling mechanisms seems, at first 
glance, to be in disagreement. However, these differences can be explained by the 
underlying study design. Carattini et al. (2017) utilize survey evidence from Switzerland 
to show that uniform lump-sum transfers are extremely popular compared to tax 
reductions. Kallbekken et al. (2011), by contrast, use lab experiments to provide 
arguments for targeted transfers. The reason for the divergence between these two 
studies is that Kallbekken et al. (2011) do not account for the fact that rich households 
consume more carbon-intensive goods in absolute terms, while poor households spend a 
higher share of their income on carbon-intensive goods (Grainger and Kolstad, 2010; 
Levinson and O’Brien, 2015). Failure to account for this fact leads to the misleading 
conclusion that uniform lump-sum recycling is regressive, when it is in fact progressive. 
We therefore conclude that, on balance, the behavioral literature supports the 
hypothesis that uniform lump-sum transfers are extremely popular with voters. This 
literature, however, also provides a rationale for more equitable directed transfers or 
green spending as recycling options, depending on the specific circumstances. For 
instance, having a large gap in infrastructure financing could justify using carbon pricing 
revenue for investment in (green) infrastructure (Edenhofer et al., 2017; OECD, 2017).   
 
 
2.2 Political science  
Several recent studies in political science complement the findings from behavioral 
science. There are two major lessons relevant to carbon pricing and revenue allocation. 
The first is related to political trust: Climate policies have been weakened cross-
nationally by public distrust of politicians and perceptions of corruption in government 
(Hammar and Jagers, 2006; Baranzini et al., 2014; Rafaty, 2017). As Figure 2 shows, the 
only countries with a carbon price above $40/tCO2 are relatively high-trust and low-
corruption. This suggests that carbon-pricing revenues should be allocated so as to 
minimize further grounds for political distrust, and ideally to reinforce greater 
confidence in government. In countries with low levels of political trust, the 
introduction of a carbon price may be more probable if the majority or all of revenues 
were allocated as uniform lump-sum transfers to citizens. Such an approach would be 
particularly salient to the average household and may reinforce perceptions of 
government responsiveness. However, efficient and equitable tax swaps may also be 
promoted by taking the various issues of tax reform in globalized economies out of 
their various separate compartments (Hourcade and Combet, 2017). For instance, in 
Sweden, the political acceptance for a broad reform of the fiscal system has been 
enhanced by a process of social deliberation and dialogue (Sterner, 1995; Agel et al., 
1996). Such a comprehensive approach may have promoted trust and laid the 
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foundation for the subsequent rise of the carbon price (from 27€/tCO2 in 1991 to 
around 130$/tCO2 in 2017). 
 
 
Figure 2: Carbon prices, corruption and trust Carbon prices in selected countries plotted against public 
perceptions of corruption and levels of trust in government. All data is for 2012. Based on carbon price data from 
OECD (2016), corruption perception data from Standaert (2015), and trust data from Schwab (2012). Countries 
are labeled according to ISO countries codes. Countries highlighted in grey have a carbon price above $40/tCO2.  
 
The second lesson relates to the importance of ensuring carbon-pricing stability under 
successive changes in government. In their dynamic model, Aklin and Urpelainen 
(2013) explain that clean energy transition policies are affected, among other things, 
by strategic and intertemporal considerations of party competition: “the government 
insures against loss of power by strategically overfunding (underfunding) clean energy 
when it expects to lose power to a political challenger who is hostile to (interested in) 
sustainable energy policies.” This type of positive reinforcement is fairly 
straightforward in the case of funding clean energy, since companies and 
constituencies supporting such policies are formed as a result of the funding. But in 
the case of carbon pricing, constituencies that come out ahead must be deliberately 
created through revenue allocation. To ensure the carbon price survives and rises over 
successive partisan changes in government, it is important to ensure that the benefits 
of revenue recycling accrue to those most likely to support and reinforce the policy 
under future government administrations. Under Olson’s (1965) framework (see also 
Section 2.1), this would entail spreading the costs of carbon pricing across the 
population while concentrating the benefits to a small group (i.e. targeted transfers to 
particularly affected citizens or industries). But in order to ensure the policy’s 
longevity, one may also see the logic in recycling revenues to the largest possible 
proportion of the population, which would in turn suggest that uniform lump-sum 
transfers may be a stable and resilient option.  
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These two lessons from the political science literature—on the importance of political 
trust as well as strategic dynamics of party competition—complement the behavioral 
studies pointing to the popularity of uniform lump-sum transfers to households. 
Indeed, uniform transfers may be more effective at resisting carbon-pricing rollback 
attempts than targeted transfers to particularly affected households. This is because, 
as Rothstein (1998) concludes in the context of social protection policies, “the “poor,” 
the “underprivileged,” the “working class,” or any other such social group is simply too 
small to constitute a sufficient electoral base for a comprehensive universal welfare 
policy. Conversely, one can only reckon with support for this policy from white-collar 
groups and the middle class if it is so formulated as to serve their interests as well” 
(Rothstein 1998, p. 153). The universality of Social Security and Medicare in the United 
States, for example, has largely safeguarded these programs from multiple rollback 
attempts in the twentieth and early twenty-first century. Among carbon revenue 
options, uniform lump-sum transfers are most likely to reinforce this kind of policy 
stability. A related consideration is that very few people, not even the poorest citizens, 
tend to (or want to) think of themselves as poor and therefore needful of government 
assistance (Gilens, 2009), which may make equal per-capita dividends more popular. 
 
2.3. Recent advances in public economics of carbon pricing 
This article takes the perspective that acceptability is the most important consideration 
for designing carbon pricing schemes. As such, lessons on equity and efficiency as 
obtained by traditional economic methods are subsidiary to the primary challenge of 
acceptability. Nevertheless, they matter in a fundamental sense – for good policy 
design – and in that they also influence the acceptability of a carbon price. We hence 
consider next the insights on carbon pricing obtained by traditional general equilibrium 
modeling in economics. This tradition includes (i) small economic models that precisely 
identify specific effects; and (ii) large numerical models that yield quantitative insight 
into policies in specific countries. 
 
First, a large body of literature has examined how tax constraints that arise in the 
context of environmental taxation should influence the design of a carbon tax reform. 
For example, Klenert and Mattauch (2016) find that uniform lump-sum recycling is 
preferable to linear income tax cuts from the point of view of enhancing equity. 
Moreover, real-world governments face informational and political constraints, pre-
existing distortionary taxes and resistance of special interest groups (Bennear and 
Stavins, 2007; Combet, 2013). As a consequence, such analyses will almost always be 
“second best”, that is, the optimal carbon tax reform is examined when crucial 
information or policy options are unavailable.  
 
The constraint generally believed to be most relevant for deriving optimal income 
taxes is the unobservability of individual households’ skill levels and the consequential 
unavailability of individualized lump-sum transfers to the households, as pioneered by 
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Mirrlees (1971).  Based on these assumptions, recent research determines optimal 
non-linear labor taxes in the presence of an environmental externality (Aigner, 2014; 
Cremer et al., 1998, 2010; Cremer and Gahvari, 2001; Jacobs and de Mooij, 2015). One 
important conclusion from this literature is that income tax cuts are not necessarily 
more efficient than uniform lump-sum transfers (Jacobs and de Mooij, 2015; Klenert 
et al., 2016). This result is a consequence of the assumption that all taxes are already 
optimally set: the labor tax redistributes optimally between households and generates 
revenue. Additional revenue can be raised by non-distortionary uniform lump-sum 
transfers. In such a setting, recycling carbon tax revenue by cutting taxes is 
distortionary and uniform lump-sum recycling is the preferred option – the tax reform 
is hence only partial in that it concerns only the carbon tax. If, instead, the labor tax 
system is suboptimal, a comprehensive tax reform is possible in the following sense: 
The carbon tax revenue can be used to move the tax system closer to its optimum, thus 
enhancing both equity and efficiency (Klenert et al., 2016). 
 
Second, increased data availability and computational possibilities have popularized 
the use of larger models that combine micro- and macro-economic analysis. These 
models can provide quantitative statements by analyzing the equity and efficiency 
impacts of different revenue recycling mechanisms in a calibrated setting. They can 
account for various general equilibrium effects that are often neglected in smaller 
models for analytical tractability.  
 
There are three main messages from such modeling (Carbone et al., 2013; Combet and 
Méjean, 2017; Goulder and Hafstead, 2013; McKibbin et al., 2012; Rausch et al., 2011; 
Williams III et al., 2015; see Part II of the Supplementary Information): First, almost all 
studies agree that recycling the revenue through capital or corporate tax cuts leads to 
the lowest consumption/income losses or even to gains in the long term. Labor tax 
reductions are less efficient and directed and uniform transfers perform worst in terms 
of efficiency. Second, regarding short-term effects on income and consumption, most 
studies disagree which recycling mechanism performs best. McKibbin et al. (2012) 
even find that uniform lump-sum transfers are superior to other recycling mechanisms 
in the short term. Third, with respect to distributional impacts, directed transfers are 
most equitable, followed by uniform transfers, labor tax cuts and capital tax cuts. 
Regarding non-neutral recycling options - that is options that do not return the revenue 
to households or firms - several studies analyze the equity and efficiency effects of 
public deficit-reduction (Carbone et al, 2013; Rausch and Reilly, 2015) and pension-
funding (Combet and Méjean, 2017; Gonand, 2015) and compare them to revenue-
neutral options (see Part I in the Supplementary Information for a more detailed 
discussion). One shortcoming of this literature is that non-linear labor tax reductions 
are usually not considered, since a mechanism for determining an incentive-
compatible income tax system is missing. Hence these results must be treated as 
complementary to those obtained by the methods of optimal taxation.   
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In sum, traditional equity and efficiency-focused models provide us with two key 
insights: First, if the initial labor tax system is suboptimal, recycling through non-linear 
income tax cuts can enhance both equity and efficiency. Second, if the initial tax system 
is optimal, uniform lump-sum recycling outperforms labor income tax cuts both in 
terms of equity and efficiency. 
 
 
2.4 Ranking of the recycling mechanisms 
This section evaluates the major possibilities for revenue recycling in the light of the 
insights of the previous sections (see Table 1). Sections 2.1 and 2.2 cover acceptability 
by citizens from a variety of perspectives. They provide a rationale for three types of 
recycling mechanisms from a behavioral/political science standpoint: equal per capita 
transfers, earmarking the revenues for green spending or directed transfers to 
especially affected groups. Section 2.3 summarizes studies focusing on equity and 
efficiency. It provides two crucial insights: First, the most efficient recycling 
mechanisms tend to be the least equitable (capital/corporate tax reductions) and the 
most equitable being the least efficient (directed transfers to households). This leads 
to a trade-off between the equity and efficiency. Second, it is important to know the 
optimality of the existing tax system. The more distortionary a tax is, the higher the 
efficiency gains from reducing this tax. If all taxes are set optimally, changing the tax 
system would distort it. In this case, returning the revenue in an equal per capita 
fashion would be the superior recycling option.  
 
We summarize these insights by classifying recycling mechanisms in three categories: 
acceptability, equity and efficiency in Table 1. The main insight to be gained from Table 
1 is that uniform lump-sum recycling is the only instrument performing well in all three 
categories in both the short and the long term, given that the initial tax system is 
optimal. 
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If the initial tax system is non-optimal, uniform lump-sum recycling only performs well 
in terms of equity and acceptability – and hence has an effect similar to directed 
transfers. In that case, using the revenue for non-linear reductions in distortionary 
labor taxes also performs well in two categories: equity and efficiency. If the initial 
labor tax system is distortionary, policy makers thus face a trade-off between a more 
efficient but less acceptable policy and a less efficient more acceptable option. 
However, a part of the revenue could be directed to efficiency-enhancing measures, 
while the remainder could be allocated to more popular, more equitable recycling 
mechanisms (This in fact is done in most existing recycling schemes, see Section 3). In 
sum, if the initial state of the tax system is unclear, equal per capita transfers might be 
a safe option, as they always perform well in at least two of the three categories.  
 
 
 
3. Real-world experience with carbon revenues 
In this section, we review the common and differentiated characteristics of real-world 
carbon pricing reforms. We find considerable support for recommendations from the 
aforementioned behavioral and political studies, particularly regarding the advantages of 
earmarking revenues, ensuring their salience, and ensuring their distributional fairness. 
 
Revenues from real-world carbon-pricing schemes are rarely recycled in any single way. 
Extant schemes typically incorporate multiple uses of revenues—from recycling to 
households in order to compensate for higher energy prices, to recycling to firms to 
address competitiveness concerns, to contributing to general government or clean energy 
budgets. Figure 3 displays how carbon revenues are recycled in selected real-world 
Recycling mechanism efficiency equity acceptability 
labor tax (initial tax system non-optimal) + + 0 
labor tax (initial tax system optimal) 0 0 0 
capital/corporate tax (initial tax system non-
optimal) + - 0 
capital/corporate tax (initial tax system optimal) 0 - 0 
directed transfers 0 + + 
uniform transfers (initial tax system optimal) + + + 
uniform transfers (initial tax system non-optimal) 0 + + 
 
Table 1: Ranking of the different recycling mechanisms 
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schemes. All of the analyzed recycling schemes return a share of revenues to households 
as well as to firms, either in the form of transfers or tax reductions, or as a mixture of the 
two. Additionally, some regions use carbon revenues for green spending—including R&D 
in green technologies, subsidizing renewable energy sources, or public spending on 
energy efficiency upgrades of buildings. All regions adjust revenue priorities to account 
for preferences of special interest groups, which notably includes transfers to energy-
intensive firms that are especially affected by the carbon price. 
 
These similarities aside, the cases assessed show stark variation in the relative shares of 
revenues going to firms, households and the general budget. Even within a single country, 
different sub-national carbon-pricing schemes follow disparate revenue priorities. The 
Canadian province of Alberta, for example, plans to allocate more than half of carbon-
pricing revenues to green spending, while British Columbia returns all revenues to 
households and firms. None of the regions strictly accounts for the insights from the 
literature reviewed in the previous section, although some, particularly Switzerland, do 
more than others.  
 
 
Figure 3: Real world revenue recycling Comparison of the revenue-recycling options of five carbon tax schemes. 
Note that British Columbia committed to additional spending, independent of the raised revenue. Therefore the 
spending exceeds 100 %. Data sources: AB (2016), BC (2016), Beck et al. (2015), Carl and Fedor (2016),  FOEN (2017), 
Jotzo (2012). Sweden recycles roughly half of its revenues through labor income tax cuts and other tax cuts; the other 
half is attributed to the general budget. There is however no direct link established between the tax cuts and the 
revenue streams, so the pictured revenue shares are only a rough approximation (Carl and Fedor, 2016). 
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Our selection of real-world cases further suggests that societies with higher levels of trust 
in government are more likely to agree to the government using carbon revenues to 
invest in green technologies or, as is the case in Sweden, to add the revenue to the general 
budget. This finding is consistent with conclusions drawn by Rafaty (2017), who conducts 
a time-series cross-section analysis of industrialized democracies and finds that low levels 
of public trust and high levels of perceived political corruption are directly related to 
weaker non-market climate policies. Indeed, higher levels of political mistrust may greatly 
impede increases in market-based carbon pricing, too. Figure 2 demonstrates that the 
only carbon prices well above US$ 40/tCO2 exist in high-trust countries. 
 
All regions use some form of transfer system to alleviate the burden of especially affected 
households, through directed transfers. Only Switzerland allocates a substantial share of 
revenues to households as uniform lump-sum transfers.  
 
One important caveat to these findings is the distinction between carbon markets (i.e. 
cap-and-trade systems) and carbon taxes (see Figure 4). The real-world revenue recycling 
schemes assessed herein are entirely in the latter category. The net (of free allowances) 
revenues from real-world carbon markets—from the EU ETS to subnational systems in 
the United States and Canada—have, on the other hand, been allocated to a greater 
variety of purposes (including conservation projects, water efficiency projects, and 
transit), but not typically in ways that are salient to taxpayers. It remains to be seen how 
similar cap-and-trade systems in South Korea and China will allocate the revenues raised. 
But since it is primarily firms that participate in carbon markets, a great amount of political 
effort has gone towards granting exemptions or allowances to energy-intensive, trade-
exposed firms. In the EU ETS, for example, a small number of firms have received billions 
of euros per year in windfall profits from selling surplus permits and receiving free 
allowances (Martin et al., 2014). At the same time, the EU ETS has been subject to 
scandals involving the theft of allowances and fraudulent tax treatments costing 
taxpayers more than five billion euros in 2008 and 2009. The ETS also exhibits persistently 
low carbon prices (Koch et al., 2016). These vulnerabilities of carbon markets have at 
times drawn considerable condemnation and undermined public confidence in the 
scheme. An additional reason for this is that allocating larges shares of the revenue to 
incumbent energy firms, may be perceived as unfair by the citizens, who might have a 
sense that rents on the atmosphere belong to all citizens (Burtraw and Sekar, 2014; 
Edenhofer et al., 2012). Hence, while the salience of high carbon taxes may be offset by 
the salience of lump-sum transfers to households and firms, cap-and-trade systems have 
largely been unsuccessful at sustaining a rising price through revenue allocation (recent 
reform proposals in California may be an exception).  
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Figure 4: Revenue recycling: ETS vs. carbon tax (net of free allowances) Source: Carl and Fedor (2016). Data from 
2013.Shares may not add up to 100% since annual budgeting might not match income flows and categories are not 
comprehensive. 
4. Conclusion 
Carbon pricing initiatives are spreading at an unprecedented rate globally, but the scale 
and ambition of carbon pricing will need to increase significantly to realize the world’s 
climate targets.  
 
This perspective discusses different recycling strategies for carbon tax revenue in order 
to make carbon pricing work for citizens. Our contribution is to compare findings from 
behavioral economics, political science, public finance and integrated assessment 
modelling to actual carbon pricing regimes.  
 
The reviewed literature yields four main insights: First, the research in behavioral 
economics highlights the importance of the salience of the costs and benefits of a carbon 
tax reform, ignorance towards the workings of Pigouvian taxes, labeling of the policy, 
accounting for different worldviews and earmarking the revenues for a specific purpose. 
Second, studies in political science consider issues of political mistrust and the importance 
of sustaining long-term policies amid successive partisan changes in government. Third, 
public finance theory generally finds that the revenue from a carbon tax should be used 
to lower other, distortionary taxes at least with non-optimal pre-existing tax systems. 
Fourth, integrated assessment models usually make the case for mixed recycling through 
more than one channel, including corporate tax cuts for enhanced productivity.  
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Real-world recycling schemes differ widely across regions but have two things in common: 
first, several important economic actors are compensated; second, some form of transfer 
exists to compensate those especially hurt by higher carbon prices, such as rural or low-
income households. These similarities are largely driven by the effects discussed in the 
sections on behavioral economics and political science. We therefore conclude that 
analytical and numerical models that emphasize the efficiency and productivity gains 
from particular revenue recycling should serve only as a benchmark, while behavioral 
considerations aimed at achieving greater political acceptance should take precedence.   
 
Our study has two main policy implications. First, we find that uniform lump-sum recycling 
is favored by several strands of the economic literature as it is non-distortionary, salient, 
progressive (and hence perceived as fair) and it ensures broad public support. It is also 
successfully employed in real-world recycling schemes. This finding aligns with a recent 
US proposal of a “fee-and-dividend” approach to carbon pricing (Nature Editorial, 2017).  
 
Second, we conclude that the ideal recycling of carbon pricing revenue strongly depends 
on the political context: When distributional concerns are the greatest obstacle to higher 
carbon prices, transfers directed to the poor outperform other recycling mechanisms. 
When instead efficiency and competitiveness concerns are the greatest obstacle and trust 
in the government is high, reimbursing firms through transfers or tax cuts can be superior. 
Earmarking the revenue for green spending might be the option of choice if the main 
obstacle is that citizens are unconvinced of the environmental benefits of higher carbon 
prices. 
 
Our findings together help to explain the appeal of current carbon-pricing reform 
proposals in states such as California and Massachusetts (Barrett, 2015; Roberts, 2017). 
As additional states, countries, and regions look to enhance the acceptability of carbon-
pricing initiatives, there will undoubtedly be additional lessons from these practical 
experiences to draw upon.  
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